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GEOGRAPHY VS. GEOPOLITICS

Isaiah Bowman

Yielding to some untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words, and confound themselves in subtleties.—Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist*.

THE current discussion of German geopolitical writings involves the names, outlook, and reputation of certain American geographers, my own included. What was their position respecting geopolitics before general condemnation of Hitler and the Nazi program began? Did they foresee the evil consequences of German perversion of truth in the alleged new science of geopolitics which made use of the overlapping data of history, political science, and geography? It has recently been declared that American geopolitics was developed before it was taken up in Germany. The bad effect of this assertion touches more than personal or professional repute. It has given the question a national context.

Geopolitics presents a distorted view of the historical, political, and geographical relations of the world and its parts. It identifies no universal force or process like gravity. It is relative to the state to which it is applied. At least so say its advocates. Its arguments as developed in Germany are only made up to suit the case for German aggression. It contains, therefore, a poisonous self-destroying principle: when international interests conflict or overlap *might* alone shall decide the issue. Against “geopolitical needs” democracy opposes moral rights. Let us look first at the way in which this opposition arises.

THE MORAL BASIS OF DEMOCRACY

American democracy strives to achieve certain explicit purposes stated in a body of doctrine expressed in the first instance in our Declaration of Independence and subsequently in the Constitution with its amendments. It is at bottom the union of two principles (1) promotion of the general welfare through the consent of the governed and (2) respect for individual human rights. Doing evil things in the name of an alleged good cause is not the cornerstone of its philosophy. Democracy is an agreement upon purposes and a selection of means that a people's sense of justice approves. When the Reichstag in 1914 unanimously approved the German government's program, which had involved the violation of Belgian neutrality, it was expressing its sense of justice and giving its moral approval. By such approval it hoped to hasten the day of victory and peace. There you have

also agreed purposes, a sense of justice, and moral approval! What was wrong with them?

Democracy starts with the individual. It believes in his general freedom to speak and act as he chooses provided he speaks the truth and acts so as not to harm the other members of his society: the natural and multiform "conflict of interests," greatly expanded in our complex modern societies, is resolved by laws passed by popular legislatures. There is no such thing in democracy as the worship of the state as an organism governed by "scientific" laws and rules applied by a dictator. On the contrary, it alleges that "the best society is that which increases spontaneity and life and variety" and that the state cannot itself produce an acceptable social life, it can only foster the forces which produce it. We hold, with Lord Acton, that liberty is possible only where there are other centers of organization than political. The state needs the voluntary support of its many-sided people, and "its business is to safeguard by harmonious regulation the rich various life of voluntary associations in the state."¹ Nonpolitical centers of organization in a democracy keep the public reminded of common purposes within a wide circle of diverse action and freedom. They promote lively and local discussion, independent thinking, and a richer context for majority decisions.

Having force behind it, a state is or should be the engrossing object of every citizen's concern. For nonpolitical associations do not have such force. One can resign from them. The good citizen can never resign his citizenship—that is, his participation in and his responsibility for, the use of state power.

The resulting democratic "culture" is not a thing imposed by government upon the individual or imposed upon other states by violence in the name of progress, or peace, or superiority, or the so-called "inevitableities of geopolitics." It is one of many cultures possible in a world at peace, each suited to the genius of its people and the limitations of its total environment, geographical, political, economic, and social. Each distinctive culture has grown up within a given environmental framework that has left an indelible mark upon it. Both the richness and the peril of the modern world spring in part out of these circumstances.

THE BAD-NEIGHBOR POLICY

It is the antithesis of voluntary cultural diversity, spontaneity, and respect for human rights and welfare that we find in the Nazi philosophy.

¹ A. D. Lindsay: *The Essentials of Democracy*, Philadelphia, 1929.

The point of beginning with the German citizen today is the state; the line of his progress is violence to the individual; the goal of his policy is the enslavement of his neighbor. His is the bad-neighbor policy. We misrepresent German political thought if we suppose that the present war is merely a result of German reaction to the Treaty of Versailles. It is a result of German political and philosophical thinking and ambition for two hundred years. The Treaty of Versailles became a plausible pretext for reasserting an old philosophy. The record discloses that most republican leaders of postwar Germany gave only lip service to the principles of democracy and international coöperation. The solemn assurances given in October, 1918, when the defeat of Germany and her request for an armistice raised the question of democratic responsibility, lasted for fifteen years only. After that the government was no longer "free from arbitrary and irresponsible influence," and the promised responsibility of the Chancellor to the people came to an end.²

Versailles gave German leaders new examples of the frustration of German aims to conquer the world. The Nazi political program has its roots in something very deep in German life and history: a way of rationalizing greed and violence. Nothing has so clearly revealed the essential primitiveness of the German theories of government as the history of political thought in Germany for the past hundred years. Its "laws" of nation growth, its recent "science" of geopolitics which assumes that "political events depend upon the soil," its assertion that "determining forces which dictate the course of states" carry over into a mystical state of mind where "science ceases and belief begins" (Kjellén)—these are among the doctrines that are separated from democracy by an abyss so wide that today only war can bridge it.

Can any informed person now suppose that German leaders had a tenderer philosophy? The power makers, the architects of the German state, expressed themselves clearly and often on this theme. Hear the testimony of Bismarck on Alsace and Lorraine. He is not speaking in 1871 but in 1895:

Their annexation was a geographical necessity. It is quite presumptuous to ask us to worry whether the Alsatians and Lorrainers want or do not want to be German. That is none of our business.³

² Solf to Wilson, October 20, 1918. In "The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference," by Alma Luckau, New York, 1941, p. 144.

³ Address at Friedrichsruhe, April 24, 1895.

If "the fatherland stands for war," as Treitschke concluded, the doctrines upon which Naziism are founded follow naturally. One cannot understand either the present-day Germany or the historical Germany who does not take the trouble to get at the root of the irreconcilable differences between them and us. No one can see the depravity of Nazi geopolitics who thinks that it is merely another way of reading political history and the political map.

We fight today a crooked and evil philosophy armed, in the case of Germany, with continental power. A whole nation has been deceived and reduced to intellectual servitude by hokum. In our future plans and dealings we must take this fact into account. It has taken war, the concentration camp, the hostage killings, plundered Dutch, Belgian, Greek, and Polish peoples (among many), fifth-column technique, and all the rest to convince America how implacable and far-reaching are the means which the exponents of that evil philosophy are willing to employ.

GOOD-NEIGHBOR POLICY: AN EXAMPLE

Seven years ago I prepared a paper for the Washington meeting of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History entitled "A New Chapter in Pan-American Cartography."⁴ In it I proposed a program of coöperation that should reflect American political philosophy and the policy of the good neighbor in the field of scholarship. For urgent reasons I wish to put that philosophy, through quotation and otherwise, in contrast with the marauding spirit of German geopolitics that purports to be based on "laws" and that attempts to apply reason and so-called "scientific deduction" to the Nazi program of conquest and enslavement.

In this paper of 1935 I proposed a Pan-American Atlas on a coöperative basis. The exact text and the fate of the proposal are of some importance now because of subsequent events in Europe. It was not a proposal to learn how to use science to "conquer" Latin America after the fashion of the German geopolitikers, but how to work together for common ends, and specifically how to do so through cultural exchange, trade, and general economic improvement. The date of the paper is also important. At the time of its publication there was no new hemisphere policy of defense, Munich lay three years ahead, and the American public had no fear and little thought of war.

⁴ In revised form it was published in "Mélanges de géographie et d'orientalisme offerts à E.-F. Gautier," Tours, 1937, pp. 88-95, and the extracts that follow are from that version. On the Millionth Map of Hispanic America referred to, see the *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 17, 1927, pp. 301-308.

It is not the completion of the Millionth Map of Hispanic America but rather the studies that the map now makes possible that mark the opening of the new chapter in cartography to which I refer in the title of this paper. It is now possible to begin a new coöperative enterprise in cartography and to open a new period in geographical science. With the millionth sheets for a base, comparable data in meteorology and climatology, water resources, economically important mineral deposits, soils, rock structures, culture and landscape, archaeology and anthropology, plant and animal life, population, and the like, can be assembled on a comprehensive map of uniform scale.

Were such a labor undertaken with sufficient financial support, and were the geographers of this hemisphere to coöperate in it, as governments and development and construction companies and individuals have done in completing the Millionth Map of Hispanic America, it would not be long before a great Pan-American Atlas would issue. One can be sure that if this were done we should have, through the wide use of so practical a publication, a very direct way of bringing about increased interest in the relations of neighbor to neighbor in the western hemisphere.

Let us consider for a moment the effect of such a joint undertaking of more than continental magnitude upon the individual countries concerned. We are all aware of the uneven advances of the civilized countries of the world in the arts and sciences. Our material endowments are unevenly distributed and, to varying degree, different in kind. It results that one nation advances past its fellows in one line only to be overtaken itself in another. In consequence, we learn from each other, emulate each other, and in the end make a better and richer civilization for us all.

The recommendation ended on a note that is the antithesis of Nazi geopolitics and thinking; that is, mutuality of effect and benefit:

No nation can overlook the advantages of a better knowledge of its own domain, its resources, its people. This is not said to accord with particularistic political or social philosophy but with the broadest public welfare in mind, whatever the form of government. It is of more and more importance in a world of growing complexity and diversity that we work toward mutual understandings not by aimless outpourings of emotion but by practical scientific studies undertaken in cordial coöperation and for mutual benefit.

The Atlas project in concrete form was presented by the American Geographical Society of New York to the Pan American Institute of Geography and History at its Lima meeting of April, 1941. It was expanded, at the suggestion of Pedro C. Sánchez, of Mexico, Director of the Institute, so as to include both North and South America, and in this form the project was formally approved.

Thus a joint research proposal begun in 1920 (the Millionth Map of Hispanic America) has grown steadily into a still wider coöperative project, embracing all the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Supported by source material from practically every government and private scientific association in Hispanic America and even by government appropriations

from a few, used in the settlement of successive boundary disputes between sovereign states, the map with its many attendant publications has become a great international undertaking in *mutual* welfare.

DANGERS OF "MEIN KAMPF" REALIZED

In the very period in which this coöperative enterprise was being pushed forward vigorously, another set of social and political values was in process of formulation in Europe. By 1933 when Hitler took over control of Germany these values were fully deployed and exploited and became the basis of his program previously set out in detail in "Mein Kampf." The background of the related discussion within Germany is of vital importance to us, both now and in our future dealings with the German people.

Slowly and almost against their will the American people became aroused to Nazi dangers. At first we thought of security in terms of the mollusk. The hemisphere was our shell. When danger became obvious, the public search began for the meaning of Nazi designs in terms of German political philosophy and historiography. When successive treacherous blows fell within the Western Hemisphere we could not fight back in Europe only or Japan only. We had to fight wherever there was fighting: our commitments suddenly became planetary. We and our sons began to sail great-circle courses of thought and action. The whole "wide improbable atlas" was opened daily as our military situation tied every neighborhood, large and small, to the rim of the world. Hitler's design was world dominion. We finally saw that our resistance must be as bold and far-flung as his design.

Thus all of us began to think geographically and to regard the map in terms of political ideas and systems. Port Moresby, Mayotte Island, and Dutch Harbor were regarded in terms that include all the lands and seas, the peoples and resources, the governments and ideologies that lie between. Suddenly we realized that even the remoter solitudes will not have their solitude restored after the war, and that victory this time means for America no resumption of something called "normal." We are obliged this time to think our way out as well as fight our way out of our international difficulties.

In the daily excitements that follow these realizations we are all strategists, statesmen, critics, and devisers. The boldness and imaginative quality that we urge upon our leaders find their counterpart in the rising flood of public comment on all international problems. This reflects commendable interest and enthusiasm in a free-speaking democracy. There is danger in it only when, under the guise of "science" or institutional name or academic

rank, wholly unsound and uncritical conclusions are set forth that purport to be based on "law," or reason, or trained judgment, or "the lessons of history." Geopolitics has migrated from Germany to America, not from America to Germany, and even the most ignorant and fantastic misconceptions and political immoralities have been widely disseminated in its name, and truth has been given spurious labels.

FOREWARNINGS RECALLED

I cannot speak for American geographers as a group. As an individual I wish to recall my own warnings published nine years, and again six years, before Hitler came to power. We were then riding on a high tide of prosperity, and Hitler, by newspaper report, was a street fighter, house painter, and shrill demagogue. Hindenburg controlled Germany, we thought. The League of Nations was the focus of international interests. German philosophy and geopolitical ideas were remote and academic so far as popular interest was concerned.

In 1922 a German scholar, the late Alexander Supan, published the second edition of his political geography (first edition, 1918). In earlier years he had published a great work on the population of the earth based on a comprehensive assembly of statistical material. Some of his later publications in physiography and colonial geography are also marked by scholarly qualities. His political geography, published after World War I, is colored by defeat. He gives his imagination full play and puts no restraint upon his prejudices. He searches for "system," for "laws" akin to those governing the physical world. My review of 1924⁵ referred to his work as follows:

It is characteristic of the German school of political geography that its logic so often rests upon mere classification, and the descent is not far from this to *obiter dicta* and the worship of ritual and mummery. There is much that is excellent in Supan's book, and to this we shall presently give full credit. Here, the point of emphasis is the spirit and logic of the work as a whole. The worst example of the illogical is in the first paragraph of the first page: institutions are the means of achieving civilization; the state furnishes the means of existence of such institutions; the state is the foundation of civilization or culture; one cannot think highly enough of the state.

I remarked further, with respect to his critique on boundaries, Even if by some process of necromancy boundaries were adjusted on all frontiers to national

⁵ *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 14, 1924, pp. 665-666 (Alexander Supan: *Leitlinien der allgemeinen politischen Geographic: Naturlehre des Staates*, 2nd edit., edited by Erich Obst, Berlin and Leipzig, 1922).

needs and if proper economic advantages and political scope were given to every nation, the equilibrium would last but for a moment, just as in the case of an equal distribution of wealth among a whole population. Birth rates differ, industries and natural resources differ, vital energy and initiative differ. Inequalities arise from these and other causes, and strife and shifting boundaries once more occur. There is virtue in the argument of 'organic boundaries' and the philosophy of *Lebensraum*, but they are open to abuse like the arguments based on history and military necessity of which much use was sought to be made at the Paris Conference of 1919. Curzon's argument regarding the protection of the Indian frontiers is the inevitable one employed in advocating 'natural frontiers' and in following a purely territorial policy.

Supan's book ends on a bitter note that refers particularly to the loss of the German colonies as a violation of any possible economic system. He inquires meaningfully, "Cannot Slavs and Germans unite as a counterpoise to Anglo-Saxons, Latins, and Japanese?"

In 1934 there was published the third volume of a trilogy of books entitled "Macht und Erde" ("Power and Earth"), prepared by the Work Group for the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, founded by Karl Haushofer in 1924. Haushofer was a contributing editor. The first edition of my book on problems in political geography, entitled "The New World," had appeared in 1921, and Maull, one of the authors of "Macht und Erde" states that the trilogy was prepared as the German answer to "The New World." The German text reads as follows:

Als notwendig erwies sich aber, jene prächtige Grossmachtanalyse durch zwei Ergänzungsbände "Jenseits der Grossmächte" und "Raumüberwindende Mächte" zu einem geopolitischen Gesamtbild der Erde, "Macht und Erde," zu erweitern, als deutsches Gegengewicht zu J. Bowmans "New World."⁶

The method of my book was to deal realistically with the political problems of the postwar world. Its philosophy was one of gradualness of change by rational means. It interposed no ideological preconceived "system" between a problem and its solution in a practical world in which historical accident, not design only, had played so large a part. It sought to analyze real situations rather than justify any one of several conflicting nationalistic policies. Its morality was a responsive and responsible world association based on justice as given fully in the first chapter of the fourth edition (1928). Looking at the competitive world, deeply shaken by the colossal losses of the war, it emphasized the need for "experimentation in the field of coöperative [planning]."

⁶ Otto Maull: Das Wesen der Geopolitik (Macht und Erde: Hefte zum Weltgeschehen, No. 1), Leipzig and Berlin, 1936, p. 23.

It was this point of view that was the object of attack by the advocates of geopolitics in Germany. The word "rational" means one thing to us and the opposite to the German geopolitical school. For gradualness they would substitute violence. By coöperation they mean that the coöperator eats the coöperee, on the theory of racial superiority. If there is to be a world association, a "new order," Germany must set its terms and impose its unique interpretation. If there is competition for resources and markets, the theory of *Lebensraum* gives Germany priority and justifies seizure. The only political experiment that has united Germany is war.

Deeply disturbed by the rapid growth in Germany of the pseudo science of geopolitics and alarmed by its territorial theories and implications as displayed in widest panorama in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, I attacked the school and its work in a group review in 1927.⁷ The review opens with the sentence "Political geography is still merely a term, not a science." Regional description and statistical and cartographic techniques are recognized as the special tools of the geographer in setting out the intimate life of communities. The review continues: "Some of the most important elements of culture seem not to get into the political geographies of continental Europe, namely, ethics, good manners, the elevation of fairness into a fine art, *cultured living!*"

Maull's "Politische Geographie" was specially selected for condemnation in my review because, as I then stated, "to put facts into a series, to invent mnemonic schemes is to achieve neither learning nor science." Such a mnemonic scheme is his table of nations classified by area and population, which puts Liberia and Norway in the same group, likewise Afghanistan and Chile. Colonial quotients, so-called, represent the same kind of error: England 8.4, Germany 0.2, only gives a historical fact a scientifically sounding name! As if all colonial quotients should be equal to be "scientific" and just, as between colonial powers.

Downright dishonesty naturally follows the use of such terms and arguments. The July, 1942, issue of *Foreign Affairs* has an article by H. W. Weigert on "Haushofer and the Pacific" (pp. 732-742). Haushofer is quoted as criticizing the United States because its "extensive colonial space structure" makes it unable to understand the population pressure of Central Europe and Eastern Asia. The article continues: " 'It is an exceptional case,' writes Haushofer, 'when an American, Isaiah Bowman, becomes impressed by the population density of Japan and admits that "it must overflow its bound-

⁷ *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 17, 1927, pp. 511-513.

aries.” ’ ’ “Haushofer forgets to say, however,” adds Weigert, “that Bowman added, ‘if not by people then by exports.’ ” “This instance of Haushofer’s utter disregard of all attempts to solve such problems by international economic coöperation is characteristic,” concludes Weigert.

The phrase “utter disregard” is much too weak. It is utterly dishonest, unless we believe in constant war, to talk in terms of “population pressure” as a thing to be relieved by theft of territory from a neighbor. Modern transport, credit facilities, technologic equipment and skill, expanding demands of human societies with a rising standard of living have given every nation access to relief from such pressure through industry and trade. It is not strictly true that when Japan exports a bale of silk to America she exports a man, but there is a large measure of truth in it. Japan had access and relief as a result of World War I and took full advantage of it. Demangeon summarized the process and the portentous effect.⁸

But a rapidly growing share in world trade was not enough. Japanese imperialism came into full flower when industrial expansion and trade success put into the hands of Japanese militarists the tools of territorial conquest. Whether we take territories won in the fateful year of 1931 (Manchuria) or those earlier conquests of Formosa and Korea, the subsequent relief of population pressure in Japan has not been through emigration but through trade. Japanese migration and settlement have been negligible.

In 1934 I said of doctrinaire writings in the international field in which geographical facts are marshaled to support political claims and philosophies:

If the economics of Poland collides head-on with the economics of Germany we cannot merely turn to the map and rearrange its parts as if we were free to plant supine peoples upon vacant territory. The historical commitment is there and we cannot ignore it.⁹

Why can we not rearrange the map at will if we are strong enough to enforce our will? We can if we accept Treitschke’s doctrine: “The triumph of the strong over the weak is the inexorable law of life.” If we believe that there is an inescapable compulsion in strength to assert itself to the advantage of its owner, then we move ahead remorselessly to do what greed suggests and power makes possible.

In my view the “geographical-basis-of-power” idea of Ratzel, as set forth in the first edition of his political geography (1897), is completely

⁸ A. Demangeon: *Le déclin de l’Europe*, Paris, 1920.

⁹ Isaiah Bowman: *Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences* (Report of the Commission on the Social Studies, Amer. Hist. Assn., Part 5), New York, Chicago, etc., 1934, p. 212.

unsound. In Germany it has become a ritual, something that one believes, something useful because it fits the national ambition to conquer and govern in the name of *Lebensraum*, a concept that has been expanded from its earlier purely descriptive economic meaning to one that gives territorial expansion a pseudoscientific justification. Thus expanded it has become one more catchword in the jargon of Hitler's National Socialism. The relations of land and society are not capable of such isolated "scientific" expression. Society is a growing complex. "We deal with rapidly developing and diverse human societies in relation to an earth of which we have an ever-expanding knowledge."¹⁰

In the face of this perversion of fact to philosophy I advocated the study of real groups of *men* rather than easy book generalizations about *mankind*. Whether we are dealing with geographic relations, demographic data, or economic statistics, we are only in the fact-and-tool stage of investigation so far as national states and national policies are concerned. Scholarship alone supplies certain definite imperatives in policy making, notably in the fields of conservation, law, and public health, to mention but three examples; but the policies that are adopted represent the people's lethargy or will, foresight or the lack of it, justice or injustice, and the power or powerlessness of leaders in shaping public opinion. A national policy is the "diagonal of contending varieties" of the people's thought and action. It cannot be otherwise under the rule of "consent of the governed." The concept of justice did not come out of a library, however important libraries are in conserving the concept and disseminating and expanding knowledge about it. The several fields of scholarship furnish in and of themselves no end philosophy of politics, no guaranteed political design. They can, however, suggest possibilities and dangers in the realm of political relations, choices, moralities, purposes, and powers, beginning with the record of human experimentation.

AN APPRAISAL OF GEOPOLITICS

I shall not attempt to follow the details of the German theories of geopolitics or further document their evolution: first, because an excellent brief statement on the matter is found in this number of the *Geographical Review*; second, because a recent book is available that every citizen should read. It is "Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power," by Robert

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

Strausz-Hupé.¹¹ It appraises and reviews the philosophic background of German political thought. It is distinguished among recent monographs on the subject of geopolitics by the fact that its author demonstrates that he has read the German geographical and geopolitical writings which he analyzes! Moreover, he has an unfailing instinct for the weaknesses of the Haushofer school and its "science" of geopolitics.

Strausz-Hupé's most discriminating and useful remark is in the contrast he draws between the general ideas of Mackinder and the German political philosophy and its corresponding "system." Mackinder¹² attempted to draw a lesson from history that might have implications bearing on state policies of the future. He described trends of power that England could not ignore. In adopting Mackinder's view, continues Strausz-Hupé, Haushofer pushed his geopolitical dynamics to the point of absurdity by seeking a fixed end to world strife through control of an Eurasian heartland. Neither Mackinder nor Haushofer had theories that could stand up to the facts of air power and its relation to industrial strength. Such is the fate of all prophets in this unpredictable world. I might add that the *mind* of man is still a more important source of power than a heartland or a dated theory about it. It is always man that makes his history, however important the environment or the physical resources in setting bounds to the extension of power from any given center at a given time.

Important is Strausz-Hupé's observation that the permanence of boundaries depends "less upon the geographic virtues" than upon international understandings about them. This is a quite different thing from the geopolitical contention by Maull that a frontier is only a hiatus between power-political conditions, that is, a mere abstraction. This is not science, either geographical or political. This is the brute assertion of a man on his way to an object defined by greed. The objective reality, concludes Maull, is the growing state and its dynamic life. As such "it defies international law and treaties." In contrast is our rule of law that treaties stand until the parties in interest have negotiated a new instrument.

In dealing with postwar problems, Strausz-Hupé's views and arguments occasionally descend to journalistic impressionism. Specific treatments and judgments leave much to be desired, for instance, the naive disposal of small states. He writes from a sketchy knowledge of Peace Conference (1919)

¹¹ G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1942.

¹² H. J. Mackinder: *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*, New York, 1919; reissue, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1942.

history. He has no acceptable solutions for those terrible dilemmas of the modern state: security, yet benefit of foreign trade; nationalistic separation, yet desire to share the benefits of a world web of communications; sovereignty, yet the protection of human rights; a world association, yet power to flout its decisions!

GUARANTEE OF PERMANENT PEACE

These dilemmas compel us to draw a wider circle around our national problems, now inextricably commingled with the problems of sixty other nations. English experience supplies a useful moral. Gladstone said in 1869 that England should have no joint interpreters:

England should keep entire in her own hands the means of estimating her own obligations upon the various states of facts as they arise; she should not foreclose and narrow her own liberty of choice by declarations made to other Powers. . . .

England thought otherwise on the morning of September 3, 1939, when Neville Chamberlain reported that Germany had begun the invasion of Poland and announced: "We are at war." Intervention and withdrawal had marked the traditional policy of England in continental Europe. Thus we, too, occasionally emerge from our Western Hemisphere shell on the principle of limited liability only. This time we say that our emergence is permanent, that we must now make sure of our future, that we are only as imperishable as our resolution. These are polemical assertions, however. They are not inspired by divine revelations. Shall we be forever secure against "the resistless forces of rebirth," or escape the weakening effect of blind reliance upon "democracy" as a magical doctrine?

The tremulous balance of international forces will vex us at the end of the war. We shall be confused and fatigued by the complexities and responsibilities in which war has involved us. We shall want things certain and simple again: we once called it "normalcy." There is no sure "science" to bring us out of these new deeps of international difficulty. Geopolitics is simple and sure, but, as disclosed in German writings and policy, it is also illusion, mummery, an apology for theft. Scientific geography deepens the understanding. But, like history or chemistry, it has no ready-made formulas for national salvation through scientifically "demonstrated" laws. There are only two "laws" that will guarantee permanent peace in a world in which the choice lies between freedom and slavery: justice based on the doctrine of human rights, and the coöperative exercise of power to enforce justice.